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Amid	a	global	emergency,	no	apparent	urgency	to
conclude	the	UK-EU	Agreement
What	can	the	experience	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic	teach	us	about	Britain’s	approach	to	Brexit?	Joelle	Grogan
(Middlesex	University)	says	state	policies	based	on	legal	certainty,	transparency,	clear	communication,	and
urgent	(re)action	have	strongly	correlated	with	the	most	positive	outcomes	–	but	these	have	not	been	greatly	in
evidence	in	the	UK.
Amidst	a	global	pandemic,	the	latest	rounds	of	Brexit	negotiations	on	a	Future	UK-EU	Relationship	Agreement
have	had	little	attention	and	less	scrutiny.	There	are	far	more	pressing	and	immediate	concerns	in	tackling	a	global
health	emergency	which	(at	the	time	of	writing)	counts	over	7	million	confirmed	cases	worldwide.	In	the	face	of	an
immediate	emergency,	there	seems	little	political	will	or	attention	to	be	given	to	a	fraught	issue	which	has	already
consumed	billions	of	pounds,	and	years	of	attention.
Boris	Johnson	gives	a	pres	conference	on	10	June	2020.	Photo:	Number	10	via	a	CC-BY-
NC-ND	2.0	licence
The	difficulty	of	legal	commentary	on	this	phase	of	the	negotiations	is	that	it	appears	little	has	changed,	and	less
has	been	agreed.	British	texts	outlining	proposals	for	the	UK’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU	published	in	advance
of	the	June	negotiating	round	found	little	support	from	the	EU	side,	labelled	‘cherry	picking’	for	arguably	going
beyond	a	typical	Free	Trade	Agreement,	though	calling	it	one.	Following	the	negotiation,	Michel	Barnier
characterised	the	UK	as	‘backtracking’	on	what	was	agreed	within	the	Political	Declaration.
We	appear	to	be	no	closer	to	the	conclusion	of	an	agreement,	and	yet	no	more	certain	of	the	likelihood	of	a	‘no
deal’	Brexit	than	at	any	stage	leading	up	to	the	conclusion	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	Past	experience	is	no
useful	guide	in	conjecturing	the	future	progress	of	negotiations.	While	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	had	ultimately
required	three	extensions	under	Article	50	TEU,	and	nearly	ten	months	beyond	its	initial	allotted	period	of	two
years,	only	one	of	those	extensions	had	been	under	Boris	Johnson’s	premiership	and	before	his	success	in
the	December	2019	elections.
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Despite	this	political	uncertainty,	there	are	some	legal	realities	upon	which	there	can	be	certainty.	First,	the	UK	is	no
longer	an	EU	Member	State	–	it	has	‘Brexit-ed’.	Second,	we	are	approaching	half-way	through	the	transition
period	which	is	due	to	end	on	31	December	2020.	During	this	transition	period,	the	UK	and	the	EU	are	expected	to
negotiate,	conclude	and	ratify	the	Agreement	on	their	future	relationship.	Any	agreement	must	be	ratified	by	the	UK
Parliament,	the	European	Parliament,	and	a	qualified	majority	of	the	European	Council.	It	is	also	possible	that
where	a	matter	covers	an	area	of	national	competence,	ratification	by	national	parliaments	could	be	required.
Allowing	a	comparably	short	time	for	scrutiny	and	approval,	it	is	currently	expected	that	an	agreement	must	be
reached	before	the	October	European	Council	meeting.	This	leaves	three	months	for	the	conclusion	of	a	draft
agreement.
Any	Agreement	on	the	Future	UK-EU	Relationship	is	likely	to	be	(or	should	be	considering	its	forecast	depth,	scope
and	ongoing	impact)	the	most	complex	agreement	to	be	negotiated	in	contemporary	UK	history,	and	in	a	fraction	of
the	time	normally	accorded	to	complex	international	agreements.	The	headline	issues	of	fisheries,	tariffs	and	a
‘level	playing	field’	(relating	to	highly	complex	questions	of	regulatory	divergence	and	mutual	recognition	of
standards),	belie	the	far	more	complex	legal	issues	related	to	a	myriad	of	interrelated	areas	including	for	example
data	transfer,	energy,	transport,	and	cooperation	on	judicial,	criminal	and	security	matters;	as	well	as	essential	and
ongoing	concerns	related	to	governance,	supervision,	interpretation	and	dispute	settlement	under	any	Agreement.
While	separate	draft	texts	have	been	produced	by	the	EU	(in	March)	and	UK	(in	May),	no	joint	draft	text	has	yet
been	produced,	and	key	issues	appear	to	be	intractable.	In	an	otherwise	ordinary	time,	a	year	to	negotiate	was
ambitious	at	best;	and	these	are	no	ordinary	times.
The	necessity	of	responding	to	the	coronavirus	epidemic	has	provided	a	reasonable	ground	for	an	extension	to	the
transition	period	to	allow	further	time	for	negotiation.	Under	Art	132	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	there	is	scope	for
an	extension	of	up	to	one	or	two	years.	Such	an	extension	must	be	agreed	by	a	decision	of	the	UK-EU	joint
committee,	on	both	the	length	and	terms	of	the	extension.	Within	UK	domestic	law,	the	amended	EU	(Withdrawal)
Act	2018	prohibits	any	UK	minister	agreeing	to	an	extension,	and	so	an	Act	of	Parliament	would	need	to	be	passed
to	repeal	this	prohibition	–	and	before	1	July	2020.	The	devolved	governments	of	Northern	Ireland,	Scotland,
and	Wales	have	all	urged	for	an	extension	to	the	transition	period.	However,	Boris	Johnson	has	reiterated	his
commitment	not	to	extend	beyond	the	current	31	December	2020	deadline.		With	mere	weeks	left,	an	extension
seems	legally	possible,	but	not	politically	probable.
In	the	almost	inevitable	global	recession	facing	the	UK	and	EU	in	the	years	ahead,	a	key	point	of	distinction	will	not
be	in	how	severe	the	damage	is,	but	in	the	speed	of	recovery.	While	national	responses	have	characterised	action
taken	to	the	COVID-19	crisis	worldwide,	it	is	likely	that	international	cooperation	on	trade,	research	and	mobility	will
be	determinative	of	the	speed	of	recovery.	In	the	EU,	while	previously	having	a	limited	role	in	tackling	the
coronavirus,	the	European	Commission	announced	a	Recovery	Plan	in	late	May	2020	which	proposes	extensive
funding	and	investment	to	promote	economic	and	social	recovery	within	the	Union.	There	is	some	controversy,
however,	where	rule	of	law	conditionality	may	stop	some	states	from	approving	the	budget,	and	otherwise	be
unsupportive	of	controlled	spending	by	the	EU	institutions,	rather	than	Member	States’	own	governments.
In	terms	of	the	UK,	it	has	been	the	worst	affected	by	the	coronavirus	in	Europe,	and	is	among	the	countries	with
the	highest	mortality	rates	in	the	world.	Still	under	restrictive	measures,	the	full	depth	of	the	economic	and	social
damage	has	yet	to	be	fully	estimated.	Outside	of	the	scope	of	the	EU’s	Recovery	Plan,	and	potentially	without	an
Agreement	with	the	EU	Member	States	on	the	movement	of	goods,	people,	capital	and	services	between	Great
Britain	and	the	EU	(as	Northern	Ireland	will	fall	under	the	terms	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement),	the	UK	will	need	to
quickly	replace	or	replicate	not	only	disrupted	supply	chains	and	investment,	but	also	manage	the
severe	uncertainties	that	a	‘No	Deal’	scenario	would	bring.
What	conclusions,	then,	can	be	drawn	from	the	current	state	of	play	and	emergency?	As	I’ve	argued	elsewhere	in
the	context	of	COVID-19,	it	has	become	globally	apparent	that	state	policies	based	on	legal	certainty,	transparency,
clear	communication,	and	urgent	(re)action	have	strongly	correlated	with	the	most	positive	outcomes.	This	guide	for
best	practice	is	as	applicable	to	the	Brexit	process,	as	it	is	in	legal	measures	taken	in	response	to	COVID-19.
Unfortunately,	sitting	mere	months	before	the	next	‘No	Deal’	deadline,	these	principles	do	not	seem	to	be	universal.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at	DCU
Brexit	Institute.
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